Optimal contract design of supplier-led outsourcing based on Pontryagin maximum principle
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Publication:2247907
Recommendations
- Pareto-optimal contracts for a supply chain with satisficing objectives
- A choice-based optimization approach for contracting in supply chains
- Optimal supply contract selection
- A robust optimisation approach to the problem of supplier selection and allocation in outsourcing
- Pareto analysis of supply chain contracts under satisficing objectives
- Coordination contract of supply chains and its optimal decision when demands rely on price
- Pareto quantity flexibility contracts for a supply chain under multiple objectives
- Optimization under supplier portfolio risk considering breach of contract and market risks
- Optimal contracts in two-echelon supply chain under asymmetric information and nonlinear demand
- The design of supply contracts as a problem of delegration
Cites work
- A game-theoretic analysis for coordinating cooperative advertising in a supply chain
- A static allocation model for the outsourcing of warranty repairs
- Analysis of a dual-sourcing service provision game with symmetric and asymmetric vendors
- Analytical study on multi-product production planning with outsourcing
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734433 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Multi-criteria decision making approaches for supplier evaluation and selection: a literature review
- Procuring Fast Delivery: Sole Sourcing with Information Asymmetry
- Production outsourcing: A linear programming model for the Theory-Of-Constraints
- The role of coherent supply chain strategy and performance management in achieving competitive advantage: an international survey
Cited in
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