The implementation duality

DOI10.3982/ECTA13307MaRDI QIDQ4682710zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Georg Nöldeke, Larry Samuelson

Publication date 19 September 2018

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13307

zbMATH Keywords

conjugate dualityGalois connectionimperfectly transferable utilityimplementationoptimal transportprincipal-agent modeltwo-sided matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility
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Cited in

(23)

• Pareto efficient combinatorial auctions: dichotomous preferences without quasilinearity
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• Local Hölder regularity of solutions to generated Jacobian equations
• Local stability constraints
• A damped Newton algorithm for generated Jacobian equations
• Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions
• Closure and preferences
• Special issue: Optimal transportation, equilibrium, and applications to economics
• Existence in multidimensional screening with general nonlinear preferences
• Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences
• The Duality of Construction
• An iterative least-squares method for generated Jacobian equations in freeform optical design
• The structure of equilibria in trading networks with frictions
• Weak solutions of generated Jacobian equations
• Expectational equilibria in many-to-one matching models with contracts
• The converse envelope theorem
• Multidimensional screening after 37 years
• Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
• A duality and free boundary approach to adverse selection
• A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts
• Simultaneous optimal transport
• The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game
• Weakening transferable utility: the case of non-intersecting Pareto curves

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