Multidimensional screening after 37 years

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.103010MaRDI QIDQ6596157zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jean-Charles Rochet

Publication date 2 September 2024

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2024.103010

zbMATH Keywords

bunchingmechanism designmultidimensional screeningrationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites work

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• When is a monotone function cyclically monotone?
• When is pure bundling optimal?

Cited in

(1)

• A general solution to the quasi linear screening problem

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