Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
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Recommendations
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and deterministic dominant strategy implementation
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Cited in
(34)- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings
- Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains
- Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem
- Extremal incentive compatible transfers
- On the fastest Vickrey algorithm
- On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Dominant strategy implementability and zero length cycles
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- The uniqueness of the pivotal mechanisms without strategy-proofness
- On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- Implementability with contingent contracts
- Strategy-proof characterizations of the pivotal mechanisms on restricted domains
- Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments
- Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
- Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments
- Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
- First-best collusion without communication
- Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations
- Characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-dimensional single facility location game with payments
- Efficiency and Budget Balance
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Unrestricted domain extensions of dominant strategy implementable allocation functions
- Local incentive compatibility with transfers
- Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization
- Detecting profitable deviations
- Multidimensional screening after 37 years
- Unidirectional incentive compatibility
- Characterizing implementability via weak monotonicity on unit demand valuation domains
- Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
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