Unidirectional incentive compatibility

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2025.106051MaRDI QIDQ6933945zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz

Publication date 3 September 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2025.106051

zbMATH Keywords

failure of revenue equivalenceimplementabilitynon-monotonicityoptimal contractingscreeningverifiability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Detecting profitable deviations
• Dynamic screening with liquidity constraints
• Extremal incentive compatible transfers
• Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
• Optimal procurement mechanisms for divisible goods with capacitated suppliers
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Price discrimination through communication
• Probabilistic verification in mechanism design
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

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