Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design

DOI10.2307/1913518MaRDI QIDQ3743064zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Hardman Moore

Publication date 1984

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1913518

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionauction designglobal incentive constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

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Cited in

(15)

• Continuity in auction design
• Non-linear pricing by convex duality
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• Small- and large-stakes risk aversion: Implications of concavity calibration for decision theory
• When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
• Incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics: a unified approach
• Regular type distributions in mechanism design and -concavity
• Combinatorial auctions without money
• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design: comment
• Unidirectional incentive compatibility
• Dynamic screening with liquidity constraints
• Project selection with partially verifiable information
• A dynamic theory of random price discounts
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions

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