Project selection with partially verifiable information

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.10.003MaRDI QIDQ7029970zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sumit Goel, Wade Hann-Caruthers

Publication date 10 February 2025

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2024.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

ally principlecutoff mechanismsmechanism designpartial verifiabilityprincipal-agent problemproject selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• A Model of Delegated Project Choice
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Global Incentive Constraints in Auction Design
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Posted price mechanisms and optimal threshold strategies for random arrivals
• Regret-minimizing project choice

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