A Model of Delegated Project Choice

DOI10.3982/ECTA7965MaRDI QIDQ5190485zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mark Armstrong, John Vickers

Publication date 18 March 2010

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7965

zbMATH Keywords

agentdelegationmerger policyprincipalrules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cited in

(25)

• Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning
• Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
• Dynamics of mergers, bifurcation and chaos: A new framework
• Delegation and motivation
• Money burning in the theory of delegation
• Why do people prefer randomisation? An experimental investigation
• Flexible contracts
• Delegation and nonmonetary incentives
• Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary
• Project assignment rights and incentives for eliciting ideas
• Bargaining failures and merger policy
• Delegated concept testing in new product development
• Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
• Merger selection, evidence provision, and the timing of merger control
• Minimax decision rules for planning under uncertainty: drawbacks and remedies
• Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
• Regret-minimizing project choice
• Delegation to incentivize information production
• Delegated online search
• Screening for breakthroughs
• Information design in the principal-agent problem
• Project selection with partially verifiable information
• Algorithmic contract theory: a survey
• Delegated stochastic probing
• Repeated delegation

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