Algorithmic contract theory: a survey

DOI10.1561/0400000113MaRDI QIDQ7036406zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Publication date 28 January 2025

Published in Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1561/0400000113

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic game theoryclassification and predictiondesign and analysis of algorithmseconomics of information and the webgame-theoretic learningonline learningoperations research

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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Cited in

(3)

• Improved approximation algorithms for combinatorial contracts with type constraints
• Information design in the principal-agent problem
• Multi-agent contracts

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