Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
From MaRDI portal
Cited in
(58)- A note on Deaton's theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation
- Price-quantity duality in planning procedures
- The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
- Bilateral monopoly with imperfect information
- On Pareto-improving redistributions of aggregate economic gains
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- Money, information and equilibrium in large economies
- Fair allocations in large economies
- On the robustness of strategy proof mechanisms
- Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy
- Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence
- Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive
- Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange
- Incentive-compatibility in large games
- Reduced cost functions and their applications
- Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing.
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games
- Peter J. Hammond
- Disequilibrium trade in a large market for an indivisible good
- Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
- Majority rule and selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with discrete skill levels
- The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution
- Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary
- Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game
- Perfect and proper equilibria in large games
- Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets
- Bargaining set and anonymous core without the monotonicity assumption
- Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
- No externalities: a characterization of efficiency and incentive compatibility with public goods
- Tax systems and direct mechanisms in large finite economies
- Policy discrimination with and without interpersonal comparisons of utility
- Anonymity and individual risk
- Bayesian auctions with efficient queries
- Inventory sharing and coordination among \(n\) independent retailers
- Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with a minimum-utility constraint
- Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses
- Improved revenue bounds for posted-price and second-price mechanisms
- Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium
- Voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules
- Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: a mechanism design approach
- Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations
- Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules
- On the optimality of optimal income taxation
- Price dispersion in dynamic competition
- The optimal taxation of couples
- Arrow's theorem, ultrafilters, and reverse mathematics
- Optimal taxation with multiple incomes and types
- Information orders in screening problems
- Optimal auctions through deep learning: advances in differentiable economics
- Algorithmic contract theory: a survey
- A story of consistency: bridging the gap between Bentham and Rawls foundations
- Monte Carlo sampling processes and incentive compatible allocations in large economies
- Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population
- The marginal tariff approach without single-crossing
- Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria
- A generalization of the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation
This page was built for publication: Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4197583)
