Stochastic dominance strategyproofness and submodularity

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2026.102568MaRDI QIDQ7364818zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ryo Tsukamoto

Publication date 2 October 2026

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2026.102568

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A generalization of the Shapley-ichiishi result
• A new basis and the Shapley value
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems
• Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
• Cores of convex games
• Decomposing random mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
• Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games

This page was built for publication: Stochastic dominance strategyproofness and submodularity

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7364818)