Equilibria and incentives in private information economies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2397644
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.010zbMath1400.91294OpenAlexW2594433176MaRDI QIDQ2397644
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.010
asymmetric informationprivate coreincentive compatibilityWalrasian expectations equilibriuminsurance equilibriumprivate information economy
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (2)
Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications ⋮ Perfect and proper equilibria in large games
Cites Work
- Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
- Core and equilibria under ambiguity
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
- Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
- Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case
- Private information in large economies
- The core of an economy with differential information
- Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
- Informational robustness of competitive equilibria.
- Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Core convergence with asymmetric information
- Value allocation under ambiguity
- Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
- Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
- The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
- Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents
- Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
- The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
- Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
This page was built for publication: Equilibria and incentives in private information economies