Equilibria and incentives in private information economies

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.010zbMATH Open1400.91294OpenAlexW2594433176MaRDI QIDQ2397644FDOQ2397644

Authors: Yanyan Li 

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.010

Recommendations

• Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
• Private information in large economies
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationincentive compatibilityprivate coreWalrasian expectations equilibriuminsurance equilibriumprivate information economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
• Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
• Core convergence with asymmetric information
• Value allocation under ambiguity
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
• Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
• Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
• The core of an economy with differential information
• Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty
• Core and equilibria under ambiguity
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
• Private information in large economies
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• Informational robustness of competitive equilibria.

Cited In (10)

• Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications
• Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
• The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?
• On the interactions of incentive and information structures
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Private information in large economies
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Neutrality and the private provision of public goods with incomplete information
• Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
• Perfect and proper equilibria in large games

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