Equilibria and incentives in private information economies

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.02.010MaRDI QIDQ2397644zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 23 May 2017

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationincentive compatibilityprivate coreWalrasian expectations equilibriuminsurance equilibriumprivate information economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
• Private information in large economies
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies

Cites work

• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
• Asymptotic Efficiency in Large Exchange Economies With Asymmetric Information
• Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty
• Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information
• Core and equilibria under ambiguity
• Core convergence with asymmetric information
• Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
• Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
• Informational robustness of competitive equilibria.
• Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Monte Carlo simulation of macroeconomic risk with a continuum of agents: the general case
• Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives
• Private information in large economies
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
• The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
• The core of an economy with differential information
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• Value allocation under ambiguity

Cited in

(10)

• Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications
• Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
• The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?
• On the interactions of incentive and information structures
• Private information in large economies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2209547 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864931 (Why is no real title available?)
• Neutrality and the private provision of public goods with incomplete information
• Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
• Perfect and proper equilibria in large games

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