Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105585OpenAlexW4309938782MaRDI QIDQ2682794

Ashwin Kambhampati

Publication date: 1 February 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105585

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessrandomizationzero-sum gamesprincipal-agent models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (2)

Robust incentives for risk ⋮ Robust Incentives for Teams

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On general minimax theorems
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• Randomization and Ambiguity Aversion
• Minimax Theorems

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