Robust Incentives for Teams
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6181691
DOI10.3982/ecta16280MaRDI QIDQ6181691
Publication date: 23 January 2024
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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- Potential games
- Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
- Calibrated Incentive Contracts
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
- Sellers with Misspecified Models
- Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
- Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities
- Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
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