Robust Incentives for Teams

DOI10.3982/ecta16280MaRDI QIDQ6181691

Juuso Toikka, Tianjiao Dai

Publication date: 23 January 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessmoral hazardincentivesoptimal contractsteamsmaxminlinear contractsinterest alignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Systems theory; control (93-XX)

Cites Work

• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Potential games
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• Calibrated Incentive Contracts
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Sellers with Misspecified Models
• Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
• Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms

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