Robust Incentives for Teams
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Publication:6181691
DOI10.3982/ECTA16280MaRDI QIDQ6181691FDOQ6181691
Authors: Tianjiao Dai, Juuso Toikka
Publication date: 23 January 2024
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Potential games
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Calibrated incentive contracts
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
- Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
- Sellers with misspecified models
- Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
- Robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities
- Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
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