Robust Incentives for Teams

DOI10.3982/ECTA16280MaRDI QIDQ6181691zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Tianjiao Dai, Juuso Toikka

Publication date 23 January 2024

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessincentivesmaxminmoral hazardteamsoptimal contractslinear contractsinterest alignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Systems theory; control (93-XX)

Recommendations

• The optimality of team contracts
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Optimal multi-agent performance measures for team contracts
• Robust incentives for risk

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Potential games
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities
• Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Sellers with misspecified models
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(6)

• Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition
• Data-driven contract design
• Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
• Robust performance evaluation of independent agents
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents
• A general framework for robust contracting models

This page was built for publication: Robust Incentives for Teams

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6181691)