Robust Incentives for Teams

DOI10.3982/ECTA16280MaRDI QIDQ6181691FDOQ6181691

Authors: Tianjiao Dai, Juuso Toikka 

Publication date: 23 January 2024

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

robustnessincentivesmaxminmoral hazardteamsoptimal contractslinear contractsinterest alignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Systems theory; control (93-XX)

Cites Work

• Potential games
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
• Sellers with misspecified models
• Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism: Figure 1
• Robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem

Cited In (6)

• Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition
• Data-driven contract design
• Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
• Robust performance evaluation of independent agents
• Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents
• A general framework for robust contracting models

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