The complexity of contracts
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Cites work
- ``Product partition and related problems of scheduling and systems reliability: computational complexity and approximation
- A \((1-1/e)\)-approximation algorithm for the generalized assignment problem
- A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079349 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in
(26)- Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design
- Minimum-regret contracts for principal-expert problems
- Optimal contracts for outsourced computation
- Mediated contracts and mechanism design
- Computational principal-agent problems
- Costly Contract Contingencies
- Learning approximately optimal contracts
- Whither Formal Contracts?
- Learning approximately optimal contracts
- Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization
- Technical Note—Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency
- Multi-agent contracts
- Data-driven contract design
- Pooling of contracts for outsourcing problems with two-dimensional asymmetric information
- Linear contracts for supermodular functions based on graphs
- Combinatorial contracts
- On the (In)approximability of combinatorial contracts
- Approximating continuous multi-agent contracts with Lyapunov function methods
- Learning optimal contracts with small action spaces
- Ambiguous contracts
- Approximating principal-agent problem under Bayesian
- Algorithmic contract theory: a survey
- Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
- Multi-agent contracts
- An algorithmic framework for black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to algorithm design
- Designing exploration contracts
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