Minimum-regret contracts for principal-expert problems

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_30MaRDI QIDQ2692301zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date 21 March 2023

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64946-3_30

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Robust incentives for information acquisition
• Monitoring experts
• Learning approximately optimal contracts
• The complexity of contracts
• Reservation wage and optimal contract for experts

Cited in

(2)

• Learning approximately optimal contracts
• Regret-minimizing project choice

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