Regret-minimizing project choice
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Publication:6536585
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Cites work
- A Model of Delegated Project Choice
- Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences
- Contests with dominant strategies
- Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3092982 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Optimal Delegation
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
- Robust monopoly pricing
- The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps
- The Theory of Statistical Decision
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