Robust price discrimination

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2025.09.006MaRDI QIDQ6911047zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date 27 October 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2025.09.006

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasiongame theoryinformation designprice discriminationrobustness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• A general framework for robust contracting models
• Algorithmic Price Discrimination
• Data provision to an informed seller
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Fair price discrimination
• On fair price discrimination in multi-unit markets
• On general minimax theorems
• Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
• Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
• Regret-minimizing project choice
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• Reputation-based persuasion platforms
• Robust monopoly pricing

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