On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
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Cites work
- An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
- Bundling information goods: pricing, profits, and efficiency
- Dynamic incentive-aware learning: robust pricing in contextual auctions
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Dynamic pricing without knowing the demand function: risk bounds and near-optimal algorithms
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design and the virtual-pivot mechanism
- Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
- Robust monopoly pricing
- Robust screening under ambiguity
- Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
- Sequential screening
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
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