Screening for breakthroughs
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3512021 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3539473 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2171466 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
- A Model of Delegated Project Choice
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- Convex Analysis
- Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
- Discounted quotas
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Dynamic mechanism design: dynamic arrivals and changing values
- Efficiency and equality in a simple model of efficient unemployment insurance
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
- Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
- On selecting the right agent
- Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
- Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Regret-minimizing project choice
- Repeated delegation
- Revenue management without commitment: dynamic pricing and periodic flash sales
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
- Screening for breakthroughs
- Selling options
- Sequential screening
- Setbacks, shutdowns, and overruns
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