Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2010.03.014MaRDI QIDQ617676zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hitoshi Matsushima, Koichi Miyazaki, Nobuyuki Yagi

Publication date 13 January 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.014

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationfull surplus extractionhidden informationlinking mechanismsmultitask agencyno side payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• A note on Matsushima's regularity condition
• An experimental study of storable votes
• Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
• Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Game theory
• Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3121285 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
• Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
• Storable votes

Cited in

(4)

• Corrigendum to: ``Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
• Marginal reputation
• Screening for breakthroughs
• Approximate implementation in Markovian environments

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