Marginal reputation
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1461253 (Why is no real title available?)
- A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
- A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
- A reputation for honesty
- Bad Reputation
- Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
- Comparative cheap talk
- Detecting profitable deviations
- Dynamic communication with biased senders
- Dynamic sender-receiver games
- Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
- Goodwill in communication
- Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Observations on cooperation
- On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
- On the Borel-Cantelli Lemmas, the Erdős-Rényi Theorem, and the Kochen-Stone Theorem
- On the value of repetition for communication games
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
- Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling
- Optimal transport for applied mathematicians. Calculus of variations, PDEs, and modeling
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
- Repeated Games
- Repeated communication with private lying costs
- Repeated delegation
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Reputation effects under interdependent values
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
- Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
- Simple bounds on the value of a reputation
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- When is reputation bad?
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