Observations on cooperation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDX076MaRDI QIDQ4610467zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuval Heller, Erik Mohlin

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.15310

zbMATH Keywords

community enforcementimage scoringindirect reciprocityprisoner's dilemmarandom matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Abstract: We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types. The presence of committed agents destabilizes previously proposed mechanisms for sustaining cooperation. We present a novel intuitive combination of strategies that sustains cooperation in various environments. Moreover, we show that under an additional assumption of stationarity, this combination of strategies is essentially the unique mechanism to support full cooperation, and it is robust to various perturbations. Finally, we extend the results to a setup in which agents also observe actions played by past opponents against the current partner, and we characterize which observation structure is optimal for sustaining cooperation.

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Cited in

(24)

• On sustaining cooperation without public observations
• Social learning and the shadow of the past
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Cooperation in partly observable networked markets
• Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
• Conditional cooperation and cultural worldviews
• Conditional cooperation: review and refinement
• Optimal partnership in a repeated prisoner's dilemma
• The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity
• Stag hunt with unknown outside options
• Third party interventions mitigate conflicts on interdependent networks
• Community enforcement using modal actions
• Plausible cooperation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054716 (Why is no real title available?)
• Cooperation, dialogue and ethics
• Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 912622 (Why is no real title available?)
• Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
• Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
• Marginal reputation
• Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria
• Super-Nash performance
• Pay it forward: theory and experiment
• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play

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