The evolution of morals under indirect reciprocity
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Publication:1995482
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.01.004zbMATH Open1458.91031OpenAlexW3121910149MaRDI QIDQ1995482FDOQ1995482
Claudia Keser, Alexia Gaudeul, Stephan Müller
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2019s-29.pdf
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- The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
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Cites Work
- Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
- The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
- Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
- Evolution and Kantian morality
- Social norms and random matching games
- Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
- On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
- Observations on Cooperation
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