Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
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Cited in
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- A model of gradual information disclosure
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- A reputation for honesty
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620856 (Why is no real title available?)
- A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes
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- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1487900 (Why is no real title available?)
- Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Simple bounds on the value of a reputation
- Reputation effects
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- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Introducing to the evolution of preferences
- Bad reputation with simple rating systems
- Repeated communication with private lying costs
- Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
- Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
- Sequential veto bargaining with incomplete information
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Marginal reputation
- Bad reputation due to incompetent expert
- Reputation building under uncertain monitoring
- Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
- Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics
- When is reputation bad?
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