Audited reputation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.02.035MaRDI QIDQ1934883zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hong Xu, J. Chen, Andrew B. Whinston

Publication date 29 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035

zbMATH Keywords

auditinfinitely repeated gamereputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cited in

(3)

• The market for liars: reputation and auditor honesty
• Seller Reputation
• Reputation for Quality

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