Audited reputation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.02.035zbMATH Open1255.91043OpenAlexW4234787028MaRDI QIDQ1934883FDOQ1934883

Hong Xu, J. Chen, Andrew B. Whinston

Publication date: 29 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035

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zbMATH Keywords

auditreputationinfinitely repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cited In (2)

• Seller Reputation
• Reputation for Quality

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