The market for liars: reputation and auditor honesty

DOI10.1111/IJET.12080zbMATH Open1398.91223OpenAlexW1844938181MaRDI QIDQ4584803FDOQ4584803

Authors: Andrew McLennan, In-Uck Park 

Publication date: 4 September 2018

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/f770847c-4a39-4821-a873-6f698ee279cd

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zbMATH Keywords

independenceaudit insuranceauditor reputationfee premium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Cited In (3)

• Does Competition Affect Truth Telling? An Experiment with Rating Agencies*
• Auditors' liability with overcompensation and reputation losses
• Audited reputation

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