Optimal policy with credibility concerns

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.015zbMath1296.91203MaRDI QIDQ405540

Yang K. Lu

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.015

zbMATH Keywords

time inconsistency; optimal taxation; imperfect credibility; reputation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B64: Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation)

Cites Work

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