Optimal policy with credibility concerns
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Publication:405540
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.04.015zbMATH Open1296.91203OpenAlexW1969912956MaRDI QIDQ405540FDOQ405540
Authors: Yang K. Lu 
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.015
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Credibility
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Sequential Equilibria
- Perfect sequential equilibrium
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Reputational bargaining with minimal knowledge of rationality
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Information acquisition and reputation dynamics
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
- Time-on-the-Market as a Sign of Quality
- Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- Who wants a good reputation?
Cited In (6)
- Credibility and time consistency in a stochastic world
- Public trust and government betrayal
- Cheap talk, gullibility, and welfare in an environmental taxation game
- Doubts about the model and optimal policy
- Rules without commitment: reputation and incentives
- Optimal Regulation in the Presence of Reputation Concerns *
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