Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
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Publication:4883109
DOI10.2307/2171867zbMath0856.90133OpenAlexW4238583240MaRDI QIDQ4883109
Marco Celentani, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 23 February 1997
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4815
moral hazardimperfect observabilityperfect Bayesian equilibriainfinitely repeated gameimperfect signal
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