The emergence of cooperation through leadership
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2259411
DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0417-yzbMath1329.91015OpenAlexW2170773792MaRDI QIDQ2259411
Publication date: 4 March 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0417-y
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Learning and sophistication in coordination games
- Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
- Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
- An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
- Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
- Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
- Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
- Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria
- An approach to equilibrium selection
- Reputation in perturbed repeated games
- Coordination need not be a problem
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- Waiting times and equilibrium selection
- Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
- The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
- Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
- An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
- Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
