Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games

DOI10.1006/GAME.2000.0809zbMath0989.91011OpenAlexW2126767397MaRDI QIDQ5931928

Jack Robles

Publication date: 18 July 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0809

zbMATH Keywords

common interestcoordination gamesevolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership

Cites Work

• Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
• Cooperation and bounded recall
• Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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