Strategic learning in games with symmetric information.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3zbMath1048.91022OpenAlexW2125378084MaRDI QIDQ1811548

Olivier Gossner, Nicolas Vieille

Publication date: 17 June 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00535-3

zbMATH Keywords

Games with incomplete informationBandit problemsPublic value of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ Dynamic coordination via organizational routines

Cites Work

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• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• On Pseudo-Games

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