Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. (Q1811548)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929323
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| English | Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929323 |
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Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. (English)
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17 June 2003
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The authors study situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions; they characterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies when an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.
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Public value of information
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Games with incomplete information
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Bandit problems
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0.7983980774879456
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0.7969349026679993
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0.7769052982330322
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0.7768893837928772
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0.7768773436546326
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