Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets

DOI10.1007/S10058-019-00224-0zbMATH Open1432.91076OpenAlexW2955349334MaRDI QIDQ2299461FDOQ2299461

Authors: Daniel Monte, Ideen Riahi, Nikolaus Robalino 

Publication date: 21 February 2020

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00224-0

Recommendations

• Cooperation and efficiency in markets
• Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyduopolyturnovertacit collusionexperience goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Seller Reputation
• Who wants a good reputation?
• Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
• Uncertain innovation and persistence of monopoly revisited
• Imperfect competition and reputational commitment

This page was built for publication: Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2299461)