Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets

DOI10.1007/S10058-019-00224-0zbMATH Open1432.91076OpenAlexW2955349334MaRDI QIDQ2299461FDOQ2299461

Authors Daniel Monte, Ideen Riahi, Nikolaus Robalino 

Publication date 21 February 2020

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-019-00224-0

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyduopolyturnovertacit collusionexperience goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Cooperation and efficiency in markets
• Revisiting dynamic duopoly with consumer switching costs
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities

Cites work

• Efficiency in games with Markovian private information
• Imperfect competition and reputational commitment
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
• Seller Reputation
• Uncertain innovation and persistence of monopoly revisited
• Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
• Who wants a good reputation?

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