Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00064-0MaRDI QIDQ1128926zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Svend Albæk, Luca Lambertini

Publication date 13 August 1998

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00064-0

zbMATH Keywords

Cartel stabilityproduct differentiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• Collusive outcomes in price competition.
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks

Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies

Cited in

(13)

• A cooperative analysis of covert collusion in oligopolistic industries
• Product differentiation in spatial Cournot markets
• Mixed oligopolies and collusion
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
• Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.
• Price or quantity in tacit collusion?
• Can labor markets help resolve collusion?
• Will managerial delegation impede upstream collusion?
• Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets
• Collusion in Multiproduct Oligopoly Games under a Finite Horizon
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability
• On collusion sustainability and the elasticity of substitution

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