Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability

DOI10.1007/S00712-023-00851-WMaRDI QIDQ6546979zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Williams Huamani, Marcelo José Braga, Lucas Campio Pinha

Publication date 30 May 2024

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00712-023-00851-W

zbMATH Keywords

antitrust enforcementcartel stabilitydegree of product differentiationquantity-setting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Cartel stability under quality differentiation
• Collusion under product differentiation
• INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT*
• THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS AND FINES ON CARTEL STABILITY

Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited
• Collusive behaviour under cost asymmetries when firms compete in supply functions
• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Game theory
• Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Price vs. quantity competition in oligopoly supergames
• Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model
• The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?
• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing

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