THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS AND FINES ON CARTEL STABILITY

DOI10.1111/J.1467-999X.2007.00266.XMaRDI QIDQ5441929zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ankur Chavda, Marc Jegers

Publication date 15 February 2008

Published in Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-999X.2007.00266.X

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing
• Leniency programs under demand uncertainty: cartel stability and the duration of price wars
• Are leniency programs too generous?
• The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion
• Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects

Cited in

(8)

• The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?
• Leniency programs under demand uncertainty: cartel stability and the duration of price wars
• The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3860824 (Why is no real title available?)
• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing
• Cartelization under present bias and imperfect public signals
• Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability
• Analysis of current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust laws

This page was built for publication: THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS AND FINES ON CARTEL STABILITY

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5441929)