Are leniency programs too generous?

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.03.015MaRDI QIDQ397949zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julien Sauvagnat

Publication date 12 August 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.015

zbMATH Keywords

antitrust law and policycartelsinformant rulesleniency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Recommendations

• The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion
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Cites work

• Blowing the whistle

Cited in

(7)

• Leniency programs under demand uncertainty: cartel stability and the duration of price wars
• The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion
• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing
• More punishment, less default?
• THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS AND FINES ON CARTEL STABILITY
• Collusive behavior under a leniency program
• Blowing the whistle

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