Blowing the whistle
DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0092-8zbMATH Open1147.91310OpenAlexW2765097964MaRDI QIDQ868431FDOQ868431
Authors: Jose Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg, Reinhard Selten
Publication date: 5 March 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8
Recommendations
Bertrand modelAmnestyAnti-trustBlow the whistleCartelsExperiment communicationImmunityLeniencyPrice competition
Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game
- Promises and Partnership
- Price Formation in Single Call Markets
- Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in Experimental Markets
- A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
- Buyer search and price dispersion: a laboratory study.
- An experimental study of price dispersion
- Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining
- The insiders' dilemma: An experiment on merger formation
- Price competition between teams
- Experimentally observed imitation and cooperation in price competition on the circle
- Firm-specific cost savings and market power
Cited In (8)
- Are leniency programs too generous?
- On recombinant estimation for experimental data
- The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions
- Collusive behavior under a leniency program
- Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels
- Is voting for a cartel a sign of cooperativeness?
- The effects of leniency on cartel pricing
- A comment on ``School choice: an experimental study [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]
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