Collusive behavior under a leniency program

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0140-5zbMATH Open1197.91066OpenAlexW2064206052MaRDI QIDQ601784FDOQ601784

Authors: Ikuo Ishibashi, Daisuke Shimizu 

Publication date: 29 October 2010

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0140-5

Recommendations

• The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion
• Are leniency programs too generous?
• Leniency programs under demand uncertainty: cartel stability and the duration of price wars
• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing
• Blowing the whistle

zbMATH Keywords

antitrustrepeated gamescollusionlaw enforcementleniency program

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles

Cited In (7)

• Are leniency programs too generous?
• Blowing the whistle
• Leniency programs under demand uncertainty: cartel stability and the duration of price wars
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
• Mixed oligopolies and collusion
• The effect of leniency programs on endogenous collusion
• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing

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