The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2013-0139zbMath1375.91158OpenAlexW3122024838MaRDI QIDQ4588472

Harold Houba, Quan Wen, Evgenia Motchenkova

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/e4341efd-8d63-42eb-882b-f0c834cd7866

zbMATH Keywords

antitrustrepeated gamecompetition policycartelleniency programself-reporting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (1)

The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Competitive prices as optimal cartel prices
• Blowing the whistle
• The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing
• A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games

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