Competitive prices as optimal cartel prices

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.08.021MaRDI QIDQ429129zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Harold Houba, Evgenia Motchenkova, Quan Wen

Publication date 26 June 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.021

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gameoligopolyantitrust enforcementcartel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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(7)

• Some implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing
• Competition policy and cartel size
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
• Profit maximization mitigates competition
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3860824 (Why is no real title available?)
• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing

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