Competitive prices as optimal cartel prices

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.08.021zbMATH Open1241.91072OpenAlexW2073633615MaRDI QIDQ429129FDOQ429129

Authors: Harold Houba, Evgenia Motchenkova, Quan Wen 

Publication date: 26 June 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.08.021

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gameoligopolyantitrust enforcementcartel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cited In (7)

• Competition policy and cartel size
• Some implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Heterogeneous firms can always collude on a minimum price
• Profit maximization mitigates competition
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing

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