The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
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Publication:3986363
DOI10.2307/2527033zbMath0742.90020OpenAlexW2142110477MaRDI QIDQ3986363
Publication date: 27 June 1992
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527033
Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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