Collusive behaviour under cost asymmetries when firms compete in supply functions
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Publication:1934575
DOI10.1007/s00712-011-0250-8zbMath1255.91143OpenAlexW1965828565MaRDI QIDQ1934575
Aitor Ciarreta, Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0250-8
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
- The Bargaining Problem
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
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