More punishment, less default?

DOI10.1007/S10436-012-0203-4MaRDI QIDQ470601zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Erwan Quintin

Publication date 12 November 2014

Published in Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-012-0203-4

zbMATH Keywords

defaultgeneral equilibriumrecourse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Credit risk (91G40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
• Default Probabilities for Mortgages
• Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
• Endogenous collateral
• Incomplete markets, continuum of states and default
• The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects

Cited in

(6)

• On existence in equilibrium models with endogenous default
• Interest rates and default in unsecured loan markets
• Should I default on my mortgage even if I can pay? Experimental evidence
• Savings and default
• Recourse loans and Ponzi schemes
• The optimal exclusion length of borrowers after default

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