Recommendations
- Deterrence: increased enforcement versus harsher penalties
- Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
- Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence
- Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample
- Do economists punish less?
- Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
- The certainty versus the severity of punishment, repeat offenders, and stigmatization
- The truth about defaults
- PENALTIES WITHIN THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM
- Are leniency programs too generous?
Cites work
- A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
- Default Probabilities for Mortgages
- Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
- Endogenous collateral
- Incomplete markets, continuum of states and default
- The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects
Cited in
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