Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1

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Publication:5393906

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00563.xzbMath1153.91634OpenAlexW3124435939MaRDI QIDQ5393906

Pradeep Dubey, Martin Shubik, John D. Geanakoplos

Publication date: 24 October 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00563.x




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