The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.12.004zbMATH Open1280.91071OpenAlexW2054098822MaRDI QIDQ972376FDOQ972376

Thiago Revil T. Ferreira, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

Publication date: 25 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.12.004

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zbMATH Keywords

collateral guaranteeseffective default enforcementsindividual's optimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
• Stationary Equilibria in Asset-Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral
• Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets
• A derivative-coderivative inclusion in second-order nonsmooth analysis
• General equilibrium in CLO markets
• Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
• Wealth transfers and the role of collateral when lifetimes are uncertain

Cited In (5)

• Financial segmentation and collateralized debt in infinite-horizon economies
• On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties
• Equilibrium with limited-recourse collateralized loans
• Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties
• Recourse loans and Ponzi schemes

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