Recourse loans and Ponzi schemes
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Publication:2205996
DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01218-3zbMath1450.91021OpenAlexW2943591469MaRDI QIDQ2205996
Abdelkrim Seghir, Mario Rui Pascoa
Publication date: 21 October 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01218-3
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