On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

DOI10.1007/S10436-012-0209-YMaRDI QIDQ470602zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, Yiannis Vailakis

Publication date 12 November 2014

Published in Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10438/8430

zbMATH Keywords

collateraldefault penaltiesPonzi schemes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Credit risk (91G40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample
• Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets
• Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties
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Cites work

• Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets
• Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
• Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
• Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample
• Stationary Equilibria in Asset-Pricing Models with Incomplete Markets and Collateral
• The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets

Cited in

(7)

• Making promises in infinite-horizon economies with default and collateral
• Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
• Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample
• Recourse loans and Ponzi schemes
• Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties
• Financial segmentation and collateralized debt in infinite-horizon economies
• Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets

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