Optimal bankruptcy code: a fresh start for some
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Recommendations
- Using elasticities to derive optimal bankruptcy exemptions
- A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
- Fresh start or head start? uniform bankruptcy exemptions and welfare
- AN ANATOMY OF U.S. PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER 13
- Bankruptcy and delinquency in a model of unsecured debt
Cites work
- A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
- Debt Constrained Asset Markets
- Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
- Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
- Evaluating default policy: the business cycle matters
- Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy
- Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
- Liquidity Constrained Markets Versus Debt Constrained Markets
- Repeated Moral Hazard
Cited in
(6)- Fresh start or head start? uniform bankruptcy exemptions and welfare
- The (un-)importance of Chapter 7 wealth exemption levels
- Financial distress, bankruptcy law and the business cycle
- Using elasticities to derive optimal bankruptcy exemptions
- The political economy of municipal bankruptcy
- AN ANATOMY OF U.S. PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER 13
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