Optimal bankruptcy code: a fresh start for some
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Publication:1655784
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2017.10.005zbMATH Open1401.91237OpenAlexW3123988597MaRDI QIDQ1655784FDOQ1655784
Authors: Grey Gordon 
Publication date: 9 August 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://caepr.indiana.edu/RePEc/inu/caeprp/CAEPR2014-002.pdf
Recommendations
- Using elasticities to derive optimal bankruptcy exemptions
- A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
- Fresh start or head start? uniform bankruptcy exemptions and welfare
- AN ANATOMY OF U.S. PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER 13
- Bankruptcy and delinquency in a model of unsecured debt
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Cites Work
- Debt Constrained Asset Markets
- Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
- Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
- Liquidity Constrained Markets Versus Debt Constrained Markets
- Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
- Exclusive contracts and the institution of bankruptcy
- Evaluating default policy: the business cycle matters
Cited In (6)
- Fresh start or head start? uniform bankruptcy exemptions and welfare
- The (un-)importance of Chapter 7 wealth exemption levels
- Financial distress, bankruptcy law and the business cycle
- Using elasticities to derive optimal bankruptcy exemptions
- The political economy of municipal bankruptcy
- AN ANATOMY OF U.S. PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER 13
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